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Articles

THEDAY AFTER: DO WE NEED A
"TWENTY-EIGHTH AMENDMENT?"
Joel B. Grossman* and David A. Yalof**
Having decided on a fixed term presidency and quadrennial
electoral assessment of a president's performance, and having all
but abandoned the parliamentary model of a "president" beholden to Congress for his power, the framers of our Constitution decided to hedge their bets. They provided that the president (as well as other officers) could be removed by the
Congress, but only through the extreme measure of impeachment. Only two presidents have ever been impeached, and none
has been convicted and removed from office. In fact, only seventeen persons have been impeached in the 210 years of government under the Constitution: two presidents, one Supreme
Court justice, one cabinet member, one senator (whom the Senate refused to try), and twelve lower federal court judges. In the
twentieth century, prior to the impeachment of President
Clinton, only judges have been impeached (although President
Nixon would almost certainly have been impeached had he not
resigned). 1
Notwithstanding the ambiguity of the constitutional impeachment standard of "treason, bribery, or other high crimes
and misdemeanors,"2 it is now generally accepted that a president should be impeached only if he or she has engaged in conduct that constitutes substantial misconduct in office, akin to
what the 1974 House Judiciary Committee Task Force later
•
••

Professor of Political Science, Johns Hopkins University.
Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Connecticut.
I. See generally Michael J. Gerhardt, The Federal Impeachment Process: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis (Princeton U. Press, 1996).
2. ld. at 1·21.

7

8

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 17:7

termed a serious "constitutional wrong." 3 Andrew Johnson
clearly and knowingly refused to comply with an act of Congress
(albeit a politically inspired one later held to be unconstitutional4), Richard Nixon was accused of obstructing justice, and
Bill Clinton was accused of both that offense and of committing
perjury before a grand jury. Other presidents have engaged in
activities of dubious legal or constitutional validity (e.g., FDR's
Lend Lease policies to aid Britain, JFK's Bay of Pigs invasion,
and the Reagan-Bush Iran-Contra affair), but were never seriously threatened with impeachment. Thus it may be said that
impeachment of a president is the unpredictable product of perceived misconduct and political opportunity.
When the Supreme Court ordered the release of the Watergate tapes in 1974, there was widespread and ultimately bipartisan agreement that Nixon's behavior constituted an impeachable
offense. Debate about President Clinton's behavior, however,
revealed no similar consensus. Indeed, Clinton was impeached
by a slim, partisan majority contrary to the overwhelming judgment of the American people who, while condemning his inappropriate behavior, wanted him to remain in office for the duration of his term. Despite these differences, however, the
proximity of the Nixon and Clinton cases suggest that we are entering a new era in which impeachment may not be limited to extraordinary abuses of presidential power or serious threats to
governmental legitimacy, but may extend to executive actions
that are merely offensive or improper.
President Clinton's impeachment and subsequent trial before the Senate have revealed worrisome ambiguities in the
Constitution's impeachment provisions, and have created understandable concerns about the absence of any formal check on
potential congressional abuse of the impeachment process.
These concerns may have been alleviated somewhat by Clinton's
acquittal in the Senate, but they have certainly not been put to
rest. This is particularly true since the Supreme Court has all but
decided that it will not resolve such ambiguities or provide such
a check. In the Court's view, impeachment is a nonjusticiable
"political question" that is not reviewable because it is commit-

3. See The Impeachment Repon: A Guide to Congressional Proceedings in the
Case of Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States (New American Library, 1974).
4. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
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ted by the Constitution to the sole discretion of a coordinate
branch. 5
It is thus likely that every time a president is subjected to
impeachment these same constitutional issues will be debated
again and again, without much hope of increasing coherence or
resolution. Self-imposed congressional restraints may regress
into license, the concept of the fixed-term presidency will be further eroded, and governmental stability fostered by the separation of powers principle will be endangered. How long will it be
before the next Republican presidential foible ignites an impeachment inquiry by spiteful Democrats seeking revenge? Impeachment of the president, an extraordinary remedy designed
to condemn offenses that truly threaten the fabric of our governmental system, will continue to lose integrity and moral force
as it becomes merely a mainstream strategy for partisan attacka forum for the "legalization of political disputes" rather than an
ultimate sanction reserved for misconduct that cannot be resolved by the political and/or electoral process.
The day after he took office on August 9, 1974, President
Gerald Ford sought to reassure the nation by declaring that "the
Constitution works." In light of the Clinton impeachment crisis,
no such assurance is possible today. Even though the president
was acquitted and the nation may have been spared the most
drastic consequences of impeachment confusion, we are convinced that the impeachment process no longer "works."
It is thus appropriate and important, now that the Clinton
matter has been concluded-but before a similar crisis occurs
again-for the nation and the Congress to consider the implications of, and attempt to reverse, impeachment's downward
course. The nation must contemplate seriously what impeachment should be: who can and should be impeached? for what
reasons? and by what processes? Whether or not there should
be an ultimate judicial check is also a question that merits further thought. We seek to encourage this debate by formulating
for discussion a draft constitutional amendment that articulates
our thoughts on how impeachment should work in the twentyfirst century.
We recognize, of course, that a constitutional amendment
cannot by itself correct all the problems of the political system,
whose roots lie deep in our evolving and increasingly diverse,
5.

Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224,228 (1993).
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fractious, and partisan political culture. No artificial separation
between the Constitution and politics is possible-or desirable.
But clear constitutional language helps to structure political action, while at the same time contributing to its legitimacy. Thus
debate over this proposed amendment is an appropriate way to
stimulate a thoughtful and objective reconsideration of the impeachment process.
Existing provisions for impeachment are spread throughout
Articles I, II, and III of the Constitution. To enhance coherence
we believe that all impeachment provisions should be combined
in a single location. Thus, our proposed amendment includes
some existing constitutional provisions and language that we
would retain, as well as suggested clarifications, new language,
and substantive changes.
The major goal of the "28th Amendment" would be to ensure that impeachment of a president remains a rare occurrence,
limited to those occasions when he or she has significantly
abused the powers or threatened the integrity of the office. Impeachment should not be utilized merely to rebuke a president
for inappropriate behavior or, even worse, to settle partisan accounts. It should reflect a widespread and bipartisan consensus
that removal is absolutely necessary for the good of the nation.
Section 1 thus replaces the constitutional words "high crimes and
misdemeanors," which are ambiguous, confusing, and the subject
of much controversy, with a more detailed specification of offenses. It makes clear that a criminal offense, depending on its
character and severity, may warrant impeachment and removal,
but that an impeachable offense need not be criminal in nature.
For example, if the president were to move to Paris and attempt
to conduct the business of government by email and fax, that
would surely be grounds for impeachment. A president's refusal
to conduct a war declared by Congress, or to fulfill some other
significant constitutional duty such as refusing to make any executive or judicial appointments, or refusing to inform Congress
of the "state of the union," would also be impeachable (particularly if attempts at political and/or judicial resolution were unavailing). This is not to say, of course, that such alleged actions
would or should actually result in impeachment and conviction
in a particular case, only that they are examples of a constitutionally appropriate basis for congressional action.
Section 2 repeats the constitutional language assigning sole
responsibility for impeachment to the House of Representatives.
However we have converted the Senate's "sole power to try im-
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peachments" to an "exclusive right to try impeachments" in order to emphasize that while only the Senate can try articles of
impeachment voted by the House, it is (or should be) under no
constitutional obligation to do so. Section 2 also raises the barrier for conviction slightly by requiring a two-thirds vote of the
entire Senate for conviction, rather than merely two-thirds of the
senators present. Although in practice there may not be much
difference between the two standards, requiring an absolute twothirds majority may help to ensure greater bipartisanship and legitimacy, and also to further strengthen the recognition that impeachment and trial of a president is a matter of the utmost
gravity.
In the spirit of open discussion to which our proposal is directed we identify an additional change that we considered but
did not include in our proposed amendment: requiring that a
House vote to impeach a president receive the approval of a
majority of the members of each political party, and similarly,
that a Senate vote to convict and remove a president receive the
approval of two-thirds of the members of each party. Such a
rule would insure a bipartisan basis for impeachments and removals-a threshold that seems desirable. We did not include it
because parties, to say nothing of the two party system, are not
otherwise mentioned in the Constitution. To constitutionalize
them in this way might have ramifications not otherwise desirable.
Section 2 also partially endorses the decision of the Supreme Court in Nixon v. United Statei which upheld the right of
the Senate to use a summary committee procedure in trying impeachment charges against a federal judge (or, arguably, other
constitutional officers). We believe, however, that such expedients, although cost-effective and efficient, are inappropriate
when a president is tried, and they would be prohibited. Finally,
we include in Section 2 the requirement that articles of impeachment passed by the House be tried by the Senate during
the same session of Congress, and that the impeachment process
be disabled after a general election until a new Congress is convened, thus eliminating the possibility that lame-duck representatives or senators could vote on impeachment matters. 7

6. Id.
7. We thus eliminate the problem described in Bruce Ackerman, The Case Against
Lame Duck Impeachment (Seven Stories Press, 1999).
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Section 3 confirms what already exists in tradition if not in
constitutional language: that removal from office (of any impeached officer) is automatic upon conviction by the Senate, but
that disqualification from holdinr future federal office requires
an additional vote by the Senate. This is now routinely done by
majority vote; we would require a two-thirds vote. Section 3 also
constitutionalizes the majority (but by no means universal) consensus that the president is not subject to criminal charges while
in office. This common sense view is based both on clear constitutional inferences and on the self-evident proposition that there
is only one president, whose presence and undivided attention
are needed to run the government properly. 9 For obvious reasons we would not extend this immunity to the vice-president,
cabinet members, or federal judges. Indeed, such a distinction
already exists in practice. Judges impeached and removed in the
twentieth century have been routinely convicted (although in
one case, acquitted) of criminal acts prior to impeachment proceedings.
Our proposed ban on civil actions against a president (for
essentially the same reasons as barring criminal actions against
him) would reverse the Supreme Court's myopic decision in
Clinton v. Jones 10 by extending to him or her, while in office,
temporary immunity from such litigation. At the same time we
would give Congress the power formally (which some believe it
has anyway) to extend the statutes of limitations in both state
and federal courts to ensure that a wrongdoing president cannot
escape ultimate personal responsibility for his actions. Section 3
also confers on Congress the power (which it almost certainly
has now, at least with respect to federal prosecutions and suits in
the federal courts) to completely and permanently immunize the
president from civil suits and/or criminal charges in both state
and federal courts if such action appears to be necessary to facilitate a face-saving resignation or a resolution of charges short of
actual impeachment and conviction.

8. Indeed, after being acquitted in a federal trial, then impeached and convicted
and removed from office for engaging in a conspiracy to commit a bribe, Judge Alcee L.
Hastings was eventually elected to the House of Representatives by his Florida constituents.
9. As Justice Jackson clearly recognized in the Steel Seizure case, "(i]n drama,
magnitude, and finality (the president's] decisions so far overshadow any others that almost alone he fills the public eye and ear." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579,653 (1952), (Jackson, J., concurring).
10. Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997).
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Section 4 confers on Congress the explicit power to censure
presidential actions by means other than impeachment when
that seems warranted. Acknowledging that Congress has a
range of options below the level of impeachment in dealing with
alleged presidential misconduct would help to ensure that impeachment is reserved for only the most serious abuses of presidential power. Section 4 also specifically gives Congress the
power to deal with judicial disability or misconduct below the
Supreme Court level by separating the "good behaviour" clause
of Article III, Section 1 from impeachment proceedings. (Presidential disability is, of course, addressed by the 25th Amendment.) Congress could then provide, for example, for the removal of disabled or "non-performing judges," or for the
immediate suspension of any federal judge convicted of a felony
in a federal court, and automatic removal from office when all
appeals of that conviction have been exhausted. This would unburden the impeachment process considerably. Maintaining the
integrity of the federal bench ought not to depend on the vicissitudes of impeachment. Virtually all states have similar provisions in the their laws and constitutions. This would not threaten
judicial independence, properly understood; and it would further
emphasize that the impeachment remedy must be tailored to the
role and function of the officials to whom it applies.
Section 5 closes a constitutional loophole by making clear
that a president may not pardon himself from federal criminal
liability. The pardon power already excludes impeachments, but
the Constitution does not specifically prohibit self-pardons for
criminal actions, although none has ever been issued. President
Clinton announced during the impeachment proceedings that he
would not, in any case, take such action.u And President Nixon
never acted on the advice of his lawyers that he could do so. 12
Nevertheless it seems prudential to specifically prohibit selfpardons which, if they were ever issued, might cause a serious
crisis of political legitimacy. A presidential self-pardon would
simply add fuel to a fire that never should have been ignited in
the first place.

II. White House lawyer Charles Ruff assured the House Judiciary Committee on
December 10, 1998, that President Clinton would neither pardon himself nor accept a
pardon from his successor. Sec also Brian Kalt, Note, Pardon Me?: The Constitutional
Case Against Presidential Self-Pardons, 106 Yale L.J. 779 (1996).
12. Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, The Final Days 357 (Simon and Schuster,
1976).
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Section 6 addresses a particularly difficult and vexing issue-whether impeachment by the House of Representatives
and/or conviction by the Senate may be reviewed by the Supreme Court. In the case involving federal judge Walter Nixon,
the Court appeared to hold that the Constitution did not permit
such judicial intervention. 13 Although the majority opinion's language was broad enough to cover all impeachments, and not just
those of federal judges, we believe that impeachment of a president, which involves much higher stakes, warrants some potential (but not required) judicial scrutiny to assure its legitimacy.
Several justices in the Nixon case addressed this problem in their
opinions and concluded that there might be occasions where a
presidential impeachment is so illegitimate that it could not be
condoned or judicially ignored. 14
Impeachment is a political process that should not be converted to a judicial one, but in our judgment all avenues of judicial review should not be foreclosed. For example, should the
Court sit by idly if the president is impeached for no reasons at
all, or denied all semblance of due process? To resolve the ambiguity of the Nixon decision, to ensure that impeachment of the
president conforms to understandable constitutional requirements, and to avoid the consequences of an impeached and convicted president unwilling to accept the legitimacy of that verdict, we have proposed that an impeached president (but only
the president) be permitted to seek judicial review of both the
procedures and the constitutional basis for such an impeachment. The Supreme Court would not have to decide such a case,
but it would have an opportunity to prevent a clear procedural
or interpretive abuse of the impeachment power.
We would not extend this right of the president to seek judicial review of impeachment to trial, conviction, and removal
from office by the Senate, for two reasons. First, the basic issue
of whether an impeachable offense had been properly alleged
(and found} would already have been litigated; if the Court approved the constitutional basis of articles of impeachment, the
Senate could proceed to try the president unburdened by any
13. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 236 (1993). As Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted in his majority opinion, "We agree ... that opening the door of judicial review
would 'expose the political life of the country to months, or perhaps years, of chaos."' Id.
14. In Nixon, Justices White and Blackmun expressed the view that the Constitution did not forbid consideration of the contention that the method of impeachment had
violated the Constitution. Justice Souter also believed judicial review of impeachment
might be justified under "different and unusual circumstances."
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doubts about the constitutionality of the impeachment; and a
convicted president would have a less credible basis for contesting that conviction. Second, to permit review of an impeachment conviction by the Senate might delay an orderly transition
of power and leave open the question, perhaps for a painfully
long time, of who actually was president. A presidential succession hiatus is a risk that our system should not invite.
Empowering the Supreme Court to review the impeachment of a president does, however, present at least one significant problem. Would it create a conflict of interest, or at least
the appearance of a lack of impartiality, if the chief justice both
participates in a constitutional review of articles of impeachment and then presides over a Senate trial based on those same
articles? We believe that establishing an opportunity for judicial
review of the impeachment of a president is too important to be
rejected for this reason alone. Moreover, upon closer examination, such a "conflict of interest" problem may be no problem at
all. Although the House and Senate roles are obviously related,
they are still quite separate and distinct. The House must first
determine whether a trial on the merits is warranted. If so, the
Senate must determine whether the charges have been successfully proven. Certainly the chief justice's willingness to lend the
Court's imprimatur to the House's articles (or his refusal to do
so, perhaps in the form of a dissenting opinion) would give little
if any indication of how he would manage or administer the Senate trial as its presiding officer. The chief justice has no vote in
an impeachment trial, although he or she may be called upon to
make procedural rulings. But those rulings can be overridden.
Thus even a chief justice determined to influence substantially
the outcome of a trial would be hard pressed to do so successfully.
This potential conflict of interest also pales in the face of
numerous other such conflicts of interest that Supreme Court
justices routinely ignore. One might assume, for example, that
any justice would be predisposed in favor of the president who
appointed him or her, and thus should not participate in any case
in which that president was a litigant. Yet just the opposite approach has been the norm: for example, Justices Burger, Blackmun and Powell participated in United States v. Nixon, 15 and Jus15. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). Justice Rehnquist did in fact recuse
himself in this case but not (or at least not formally) because he had been appointed by
Richard Nixon. Rather, it was because he had been an assistant attorney general in the
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tices Breyer and Ginsburg participated in Clinton v. Jones! 6 In
each of those instances the justices voted against the president
who appointed them. These disputes were regarded as too important-too critical to the functioning of our constitutional system- to warrant recusal for a theoretical conflict of interest with
no basis in demonstrable bias. A similar logic would apply to
our proposed judicial review of articles of impeachment against
the president, especially since the Supreme Court would not
have any authority to assess the weight of evidence against an
accused president.
Section 7 is merely standard constitutional language giving
Congress the power to enforce the amendment.
The impeachment clauses, like the Constitution itself, were
written long ago. They contemplated a world, and a political
system, that no longer exists. There were no political parties,
and thus partisanship was not an issue; the Senate was not a
popularly elected body and was generally expected to be a council of "wise men" and experienced statesmen who would act as a
brake on the "unbridled passions" of the House of Representatives; judicial review was not mentioned in the constitution (the
framers did reject a proposal to have the Supreme Court try impeachments); and the president was not expected to be the
dominant national and international actor he has become. The
original constitutional structure of impeachment thus made
sense for its time. Providentially perhaps, it has worked reasonably well. But it is now on the verge of a breakdown. The
old adage "Don't fix it if it ain't broke," is good common sense.
But a constitutional breakdown in the impeachment process
would have serious implications for our political system. The
prospect of a besieged president refusing to concede the legitimacy of his or her impeachment, or even unwilling to leave the
White House after conviction, or of the nation's foreign affairs at
a standstill for a protracted period of time for want of presidential leadership, counsels us to take action now, rather than later,
to modify and relegitimize the impeachment process. Sometimes it is better to fix it before it breaks.

Nixon administration.
16. 117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997).
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"AMENDMENT XXVIII"
Section 1. The President, Vice President, members of the
Cabinet, and federal judges, but not members of Congress or
military officers, shall be removed from office on impeachment
for, and conviction of, serious abuses of official power that undermine their conduct of office and threaten the integrity and legitimacy of the government. Such abuses include treason, bribery,
and other serious crimes, as well as actions that are not criminal in
nature.
Section 2. The House of Representatives shall have the sole
power of impeachment. The Senate shall have the exclusive right
to try all impeachments. When sitting for that purpose senators
shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President is tried the
chief justice shall preside. No person shall be convicted without
the concurrence of two-thirds of the membership of the Senate.
Except when the president is tried, summary fact-finding procedures established in advance may be employed. There is no right
to a jury trial in cases of impeachment. No impeachment shall
survive the biennial adjournment of Congress, nor shall an impeachment or trial take place between a general election and the
convening of a new congress.
Section 3. The consequences of conviction by the Senate on
impeachment charges shall be limited to removal from office and
disqualification to hold and enjoy any appointed or elected office
of honor, trust or profit under the United States. Removal from
office is automatic upon conviction. Disqualification may be imposed by a two-thirds vote of the members of the Senate. The
president shall not be subject to criminal indictment or prosecution, or civil suit, while in office, but all persons impeached and
convicted shall be liable to subsequent indictment, trial, judgment,
and punishment, or civil action, according to law. Congress may,
by law, extend the statute of limitations in federal and state courts
in both criminal and civil actions, for actions that a president may
have committed. Congress also may grant to the president immunity against subsequent prosecutions or civil actions in both federal and state courts.
Section 4. Congress shall have the power to censure, rebuke,
or otherwise publicly condemn official misconduct. Such action
shall not constitute a bill of attainder nor shall it bar impeachment. Congress may devise alternative means, other than impeachment, for dealing with the disability, misconduct, or failure
to maintain good behaviour, of federal judges other than justices
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of the Supreme Court. Removal from office of a judge by means
other than impeachment shall require the assent of two-thirds of
the members present of both the Senate and the House of Representatives.
Section 5. The President's power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States shall not extend to
cases of impeachment, nor shall a president have the power to issue a self-pardon.
Section 6. The Supreme Court, under its original jurisdiction,
may review, prior to trial by the Senate, in a petition submitted by
an impeached president, the procedures employed in, and the constitutional basis of, articles of impeachment voted against the
president by the House of Representatives. The Court shall not
have the power to review impeachments against other officers nor
any action by the Senate concerning articles of impeachment.
Section 7. Congress shall have the power to enforce the provisions of this article by appropriate legislation.

